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SYMPOSIUM 
CREATING COMPETITION 
POLICY FOR TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES 
INTRODUCTION 
Robert H. Lande· 
This is a symposium designed for the global economy of 
the 21st century. It would have served little purpose if it had 
been presented very many years ago. Indeed, it is doubtful that 
anyone in the past even would have thought to hold it. 
During the last decade, however, there has been an explo-
sion of interest in antitrust worldwide, in both developed and 
transition economies. The number of countries with antitrust 
laws has increased dramatically.l For example, thirteen coun-
* Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law and 1996-97 Chair, Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation. 
The author would like to thank Michael Wise for exceptionally thoughtful insights 
concerning many of the central topics in this article, and Neil Averitt, William 
Kovacic, Armando Rodriguez, and Mark Warner for stimulating and extremely 
helpful discussions and suggestions. The author also would like to thank Cheryl 
Crllrdon and Chin-Zen Plotner for excellent research assistance. All opinions and 
remaining errors are, of course, those of the author. 
An oral version of this symposium appeared as a program session at the 
January 6, 1997 meeting of the Association of American Law Schools Section on 
Antitrust and Economic Regulation. Professor Spencer W. Waller's article was 
subsequently added. 
1. There are currently countries with antitrust laws that did not even exist a 
decade ago. At least two new nations that were component parts of the former 
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tries in the Western hemisphere currently have antitrust 
laws,2 with the majority of these laws enacted since 1990.3 Six 
additional Western hemisphere countries are "actively design-
ing and debating respective draft legislation on the issue. n4 
Moreover, an increasing number of countries with antitrust 
laws on their books appear to be starting to take the field more 
seriously. In increasing numbers they are asking for advice 
from United States antitrust enforcers and academics;5 their 
enforcement personnel are attending conferences and training 
sessions around the world;6 and, more and more, a large num-
ber of nations are finally starting to bring antitrust enforce-
ment actions.7 
Soviet Union, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, now have antitrust laws. See Law on 
Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine of November 26, 1993, reprinted in 3 RUSSIA 
& THE REpUBLICS LEGAL MATERIAUl, Release 18 (John N. Hazard & Vratislav 
Pechota eds., 1994); Law on Freedom of Economic Activities and Development of 
Business Undertakings Within Kazakhstan, effective January 15, 1991, reprinted in 
2 RUSSIA & THE REPUBLICS LEGAL MATERIALS, Release 1 (John N. Hazard & 
Vratislav Pechota eds., 1992). 
2. These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Chile, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, and the United States. 
See Organization of American States Trade Unit, Inventory of Domestic Laws and 
Regulations Relating to Competition Policy in the Western Hemisphere i, 
SGffUIWG.COMPOLIDOC.1I97IRev.4 (1997) (limited distribution document, on file 
with author) !hereinafter Inventory of Domestic Laws]; Latin American antitrust 
laws are compiled in 1 COMPILACI6N DE LEmsLAcI6N DE LA COMPETENCIA, 
AMERICA LATINA (1996). 
3. See Inventory of Domestic Laws, supra note 2, at i. 
4. These countries are Ecuador, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Do-
minican RepUblic, and Trinidad and Tobago. Id. 
5. A large number of countries also are asking European antitrust experts 
for advice. For a superb analysis of these and related issues, see William E. 
Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly Com-
munist and Socialist Countries, 11 AM. U. J. lNT'L L. & POL'Y 437, 437-39 & pas-
sim (1996). 
6. Id. at 472-73. A conference on Competition Policies and the Economic Re-
form Process in Latin America-held at Lima, Peru on August 12-14, 1996-was, 
for instance, attended by antitrust enforcers and other government representatives 
from 16 Latin American nations, and also by representatives from many other 
nations and international organizations. INDECOPI, PARTICIPANTES DEL SEMINARIO 
"POLiTICAS DE COMPETENCIA Y EL PROCESO DE REFORMAS ECON6r,uCAS EN AMERICA 
LATINA" (unpublished list of seminar participants, on file with Brooklyn Jou,?,al of 
International Law). 
7. For an excellent analysis that provides examples of this increasing level of 
enforcement, see LUIS TINEo, COMPETITION POLICY & LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: 
FROM DISTRIBUTIVE REGULATIONS TO MARKET EFFICIENCY (Monterey Inst., Ctr. for 
Trade & Com. Dip!., Working Paper No.4, 1997) (on file with Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law). 
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The reasons for this explosion in interest are numerous 
and complex. The overriding cause, however, clearly has been 
the collapse of the former Soviet system. Not only did this 
cause Eastern European nations to move towards capitalism, 
but other nations around the world have become increasingly 
unable to resist the tide of capitalism by proposing as an alter-
native the now thoroughly disgraced ideas of socialism or com-
munism. 
It seems inevitable that as capitalism spreads so will anti-
trust. It is difficult to predict, however, the kinds of antitrust 
policies that will emerge around the world. This is in large 
part because it is extremely difficult to determine which types 
of antitrust policies will prove to be most appropriate for spe-
cific nations. 
As an example of the tremendous difficulties involved in 
finding the appropriate antitrust policy for any nation, contem-
plate the search that has taken place within the United States 
during the last century to find the antitrust policy most appro-
priate for it. Recall the difficult origin of the first federal anti-
trust statute/ its controversial and troubled early interpreta-
tions,9 the different reasons behind the subsequent statutes of 
1914, 1936, 1950 and 1976,10 and the dramatic shifts in Su-
preme Court interpretation of these statutes over time.ll Re-
call the effects of such economic conditions as the Great De-
pression, and the dramatic effects of Presidential elections on 
enforcement priorities.12 Consider the effects of the rise of the 
Chicago School of antitrust and the current nearly universal 
acknowledgement that many prior antitrust policies were mis-
taken.13 In light of our frequent changes in antitrust policy 
and many mistakes, it is humbling that we should be viewed 
as a source of antitrust wisdom for the rest of the world. Not 
8. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Con-
cern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretqtion Challenged, 34 HAsTINGS L.J. 65, 
82-106 (1982). 
9. For an excellent analysis of this topic see RUDOLPH J.R. PERlTZ, COMPETI-
TION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992 9-58 (1996); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY 48-77 (1994). 
10. See PERlTZ, supra note 9, at 61-66, 148-53, 195-99, 236. See also Lande, 
supra note 8, at 106-42. 
11. See PERlTZ, supra note 9, passim. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 258-62. See also Robert H. Lande, Beyond Chicago: Will Activist 
Antitrust Arise Again?, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1994). 
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surprisingly, the advice that we should give is not that other 
nations should simply adopt our present system. It won't do to 
say: "Adopt the current United States antitrust system because 
it is the best one for us. At least, fifty-one percent of us think 
that it is optimal. You should adopt our system even though 
we must admit that we thought very differently about what 
kind of antitrust was appropriate ten years ago, still different-
ly twenty and forty years ago and, depending upon the results 
of the next Presidential election and the next Supreme Court 
appointment, we might change our minds again." 
Perhaps the goal of advice givers in the United States 
should be more modest. Perhaps we should instead say, "Here 
are some examples of problems that arose, our attempted solu-
tions and their effects in their particular contexts. Here are 
some of our successes, but here are the mistakes that we have 
made and the lessons that experience has taught us. We hope 
that you will be wiser than we were. "14 
Each nation must attempt to formulate the competition 
policy that is best for it (after studying the United States' ex-
perience, of course). Every country must consider its own histo-
ry, the strength of its local culture of competition, and the 
degree of faith possessed by its businesses and consumers in 
the optimal workings of the free market. They must consider 
the effects of related laws, including regulatory laws, securities 
laws, price controls, etc. The effectiveness of local capital mar-
kets, the general economic climate, and laws affecting foreign 
investment and trade are also crucial. So are a large number of 
institutional and political realities: does the country have, for 
example, a relatively neutral and non-political, non-corrupt 
judiciary? Does it have an enforcement agency with the neces-
sary resources, including in particular the necessary human 
capital? How serious is the country's intention to have a vigor-
ous system of antitrust laws and, indeed, a competition-based 
economic system? The most that United States antitrust pro-
fessionals can do in this complex endeavor is to provide transi-
tion economies with information and to act as their advisors. 
Consider some of the questions that each country has to 
decide. Should their enforcement approach be relatively inter-
14. We should remember that our experience-based expertise in antitrust is 
relative, not absolute. 
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ventionist or relatively Chicago School in orientation?15 
Should enforcement be exclusively public, or should private 
enforcement also be allowed? Should the laws be civil, crimi-
nal, or both? Should the remedies include injunctions, divesti-
ture actions, treble damages, jail sentences, personal fines, 
and/or corporate fines? Should a nation have only one central-
ized antitrust enforcement agency or, as in the United States, 
should political subdivisions within the country also be able to 
file suits? Should enforcement be by a part of the executive 
branch, similar to the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division, by an independent administrative agency similar to 
the United States Federal Trade Commission, or by both? 
Another important question is whether a nation's antitrust 
system should be modeled largely after the United States sys-
tem or largely after the antitrust laws of the European Un-
ion.16 The general thrust of a trade regulation statute should 
be to support the operation of the free market in a way that 
ensures effective consumer choice. Free markets require two 
essential elements: the presence of the options that competi-
tion will bring, and consumers with the ability to choose mean-
ingfully among these options.17 One approach to achieve these 
goals would be to enact a trade regulation statute or frame-
work for statutes explicitly in these terms. The law could for-
bid conduct that unreasonably impairs either of these ele-
ments.ls Regardless whether a country adopts a trade regula-
15. For many of the differences between Chicago School and non-Chicago 
School antitrust see Joe Sims & Robert H. Lande, The End of Antitrust-Or A 
New Beginning?, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 301 (1986); see also Lande, supra note 13, at 
1. Regardless of which enforcement approach is most appropriate for the United 
States, the relevant question for each nation to ask itself is, in light of that 
nation's history, politics, and institutional settings, how interventionist an approach 
is optimal for them. 
16. For articles comparing the United States and European Union antitrust 
systems see Symposium, Antitrust in a Global Environment: Conflicts and Resolu-
tions, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 525 (1992); see also Alexis Jacquemin, Abuse of a Domi-
nant Position and Exclusionary Practices: A European View, in REVITALIZING ANTI-
TRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 260-70 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991) (comparing 
aspects of monopolization law); Robert H. Lande, When Should States Challenge 
Mergers: A Proposed Federal/State Balance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1047, 1075-81 
(1990) (comparing aspects of merger law). 
17. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified 
Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 713 
(1997). 
18. A country could draft its trade regulation statutes in terms of ensuring 
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tion system closer to that of the United States or closer to that 
of the European Union, it should do so in a way that preserves 
both elements of consumer sovereignty.19 
The evolutionary nature of the United States' antitrust 
policy suggests that, at a minimum, countries should be flexi~ 
ble. They should regard their initial solutions as the first stage 
in an evolving process. 
Moreover, it is possible that the preceding issues, ques" 
tions and possibilities are relatively insignificant. Perhaps they 
are only relatively unimportant details. 
One could take the view that it is crucial for transition 
economies to enact and enforce antitrust legislation, but that 
the particular features of this antitrust system are less imp or" 
tant.20 It can be argued that these nations' overriding concern 
should be to legitimize capitalism politically, and to show that 
capitalism, as opposed to centralized planning, fascism, price 
fixing by the government, socialism, or communism, is best for 
the economy and for consumer welfare.21 This view says, es" 
sentially, that each nation should just select and trumpet a 
the availability of options and the choice among options that the free market will 
bring. Such a statute could be worded as follows: 
It is the national policy to foster an economy in which consumers can 
make free choices among goods and services in a competitive market-
place. Conduct that unreasonably impairs this goal is hereby declared 
illegal. It is specifically illegal to engage in: (1) A, B, and C, and any 
other conduct that unreasonably limits the range of competitive options 
that would otherwise have been present in the market; and (2) X, Y, and 
Z, and any other conduct that unreasonably impairs consumers' ability to 
choose among these options. 
A legislature enacting this type of statute would complete it by filling in the 
blanks for A, B, C and X, Y, Z with those specific items that the country was 
confident, in light of its own national experience, that it wished to ban. If the 
United States were enacting this approach, for example, it would include specific 
bans against such things as monopolization, mergers that may substantially lessen 
competition, and deceptive advertising. 
For the development and a discussion of an option-oriented approach to 
trade regulation statutes, including many of its relative advantages and disadvan-
tages, see Averitt & Lande, supra note 17. 
19. For a brief discussion of how the option-oriented approach (discussed in 
footnote 18 supra) can successfully incorporate a trade regulation approach mod-
eled after the laws of either the United States or the European Union see id. at 
753-55. 
20. Based upon a conversation with Michael Wise, Federal Trade Commission. 
21. Capitalism is often thought to be desirable for non-economic reasons as 
well. Many believe that a capitalist system will best foster decentralized 
decisionmaking and a'more pluralistic, democratic society. 
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reasonable set of antitrust rules, the clearer, more understand-
able and less discretionary the better, and then let them 
evolve. The particulars of the system-which is a more appro-
priate approach, for example, the United States' antitrust of 
the 1990s, the 1980s, or the 1960s-are less important than 
the fact that the system existS and is widely known. The cen-
tral requirement is that businesses and consumers believe that 
antitrust is keeping capitalism "honest," and generally keeping 
corporations from exploiting consumers. Under this view 
businesses' and consumers' perceptions, in additior.. to or even 
instead of marketplace reality, are what count. 
A nearly opposite view is that the best thing that transi-
tion economies can do is to decide not to enact antitrust laws 
or, at most, to just enact a simple law against hard-core price 
fixing.22 This view suggests that any antitrust policies at all, 
and certainly any policies that go beyond a prohibition against 
simple price fixing, would be likely to do more harm than good. 
Even a moderate level of antitrust enforcement can suppress 
hard but honest competition, discourage international invest-
ment, lower confidence in the contracting process, lead to "rent 
seeking" behavior, and direct attention away from more impor-
tant matters. For all of these reasons antitrust can 
delegitimize capitalism and thereby inhibit economic growth. 
Further, many of the enforcers and judges in a number of 
transition economies are likely to be corrupt23 and/or inexperi-
22. For the view that transition economies should adopt a minimalist antitrust 
policy, see generally AE. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of 
Proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries, 19 N.C. J. lNT'L. L. & COM. 
REG. 209 (1994); AE. Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate, Limits To Antitrust Policy 
For Reforming Economies, 18 HouS. J. INT'L L. 311 (1996). For a different view on 
many of these issues see Craig W. Conrath & Barry T. Freeman, A Response to 
"The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries," 19 
N.C. J. lNT'L L. & COM. REG. 233 (1994). 
23. See Edgardo Buscaglia, Corruption and Judicial Reform in Latin America, 
17 POLY STUD. 273 (1996). William Walker, former U.S. ambassador to EI Salva-
dor and author of a study of judicial reform in Latin America, lamented that this 
area contained so many "'weak, underfunded, corruptible, executive-dominated, 
antiquated justice delivery systems in which the majority of those governed have 
scant if any confidence.'" Douglas Farah, Inefficient Court Systems Plague Central 
American Nations' Bids for Stability, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at A24. See also 
Christopher Larkins, On the Courts, Judicial Independence, and Judicial Reform in 
Latin America: A Comment (unpublished paper presented at Caracas Venezuela for 
the Terecera Conferencia Anual de la Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Derecho y 
Economia, June 16-18, 1997) (on file with Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
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enced at competition matters. Corrupt and/or inexperienced 
decisionmakers can be a tremendous problem because every 
antitrust law contains terrifying levels of discretion. How do 
we really know, for example, whether a particular situation 
involves a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint 
of trade," under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,24 or whether 
the effect of any particular merger "may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly" under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act?25 How could we tell whether a 
particular questionable enforcement or non-enforcement deci-
sion reflected bad judgment, incompetence, or corruption? 
These inherently ambiguous laws would lead to bad decisions 
even if the enforcers and judges were experienced and honest. 
Similarly, this view stresses that antitrust enforcers and 
judges often will be tempted to (mis)use whatever laws they 
have been given, especially if they come from a country with a 
tradition of centralized planning or heavy involvement in busi-
ness affairs by government bureaucrats. The decisionmakers' 
learning curves are likely to be slow and painful for the econo-
my. For all of these reasons, transition economies would be 
unwise to adopt antitrust laws. Despite all of its flaws, the free 
market would do a better job of protecting consumer wel-
fare.26 
A third view is that it is extremely important for transi-
tion economies to enact a comprehensive and carefully selected 
set of antitrust laws. Not only is the public's perception impor-
tant, but the particular features of the chosen enforcement 
system also are crucial. For example, some believe that the 
United States' antitrust system tolerates monopolies unduly, 
and that Section 2 of the Sherman Act is interpreted and en-
forced in an ineffective manner.27 If a transition economy also 
were to set up an antitrust system without an effective 
antimonopoly or abuse of dominant position provision, this 
system could allow private monopolies to succeed government-
24. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994». 
25. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). 
26. Similar arguments could perhaps be made against many other bodies of 
civil law, including environmental regulation and food and drug regulation. 
27. For an excellent collection of pieces that are critical of lax antitrust en-
forcement and call for more vigorous antitrust enforcement in many areas, includ-
ing monopolization, see REVITALIZING ANTrrRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY (Harry 
First et al. eds., 1991). 
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owned monopolies. Their renaissance under private ownership 
could produce a terrible backlash against capitalism. It there-
fore becomes very important not only to have a prohibition 
against monopolization or market dominance, but to have" a 
statute, policy, and enforcement mechanism that is effective. 
Among the reasons why an effective antitrust system is 
especially essential for transition economies is that their capi-
tal markets often will not work as effectively as those in more 
developed countries,28 and they are very likely to have signifi-
cant import restraints. Their businesses are accustomed to 
having government officials set prices and make other vital 
decisions for them, and they are more likely to want to avoid 
hard competition by colluding than are businesses more accus-
tomed to a culture of competition. This third view-the view 
that generally prevails-is that the "details" of an antitrust 
enforcement system, not just its public perception, are crucial 
to the survival of a capitalist economy.29 
The topic of this symposium, therefore, is both broad in 
scope and of the highest importance. The symposium would not 
have any chance at all of producing anything significant except 
that we were fortunate enough to assemble a world class panel 
of authorities. As the first step in setting this up I made a list 
containing my top choices for potential speakers, consisting of 
some of the world's foremost experts in the field. Everyone on 
my "dream team" accepted the invitation to participate. We are 
indeed privileged. 
Eleanor Fox is the Walter Derenberg Professor of Trade 
Regulation at New York University School of Law. She writes 
extensively in the areas of competition and trade, the develop-
ment of market economies, and comparative competition 
law.30 She has held a large number of leadership positions in 
the ABA Antitrust Section, has served on many trade-related 
task forces, and has been a consultant to the Federal Trade 
28. An effective capital market will help promote entry and dissipate market 
power. 
29. Russell Pittman incisively analyzes the "fine line" that drafters of trade 
regulation statutes must walk, and concludes that "[s]ociety suffers when 
antimonopoly laws and antimonopoly enforcement are either too lax or too strin-
gent." Russel! Pittman, Some Critical Provisions in the Antimonopoly Laws of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, 26 lNT'L LAw. 485, 485 (1992). 
30. Among her most recent articles is Eleanor Fox, Toward World Antitrust 
and Market Access, 91 AM. J. lNT'L L. 1 (1997). 
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Commission. Professor Fox is the co-author of many articles 
and two casebooks, one on antitrust law and one on European 
Community Law. She is also the co-author-with John 
Fingleton, Damien Neven and Paul Seabright---of a book on 
Central European economies and competition law,31 from 
which her essay in this symposium is derived. 
Armando Rodriguez is at the Price Waterhouse antitrust 
group. He previously was a senior economist with the Federal 
Trade Commission's Bureau of Economics, and a Research 
Professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. 
Dr. Rodriguez has had extensive experience advising and train-
ing antitrust agencies in transition economies, including those 
of Mexico, Peru, Honduras and Venezuela. He has also worked 
on competition matters with the Organization of American 
States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, and has served as a 
member of the United States delegation to the NAFTA Anti-
trust Working Group. Among his recent publications are a 
monograph on merger analysis which, like the piece in this 
symposium, he co-authored with the next author.32 
Malcolm B. Coate is a Deputy Assistant Director in the 
Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Economics. Dr. Coate 
has more than fifteen years experience as an antitrust practi-
tioner evaluating the competitive effects of mergers and other 
agreements among firms. His research interests range from 
corporate strategy to industrial organization to antitrust policy, 
and he has worked on an extensive body of issues relevant to 
transition economies. In addition to the monograph on merger 
policy he co-authored with Dr. Rodriguez, Dr. Coate has re-
cently co-edited THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PRO-
CESS.33 
William E. Kovacic is Professor at the George Mason Uni-
versity School of Law, and is Of Counsel to Bryan Cave in 
Washington, D.C. His prior employers include the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
31. JOHN FINGLETON, ELEANOR M. Fox, DAMIEN NEVEN, & PAUL SEABRIGHT, 
COMPETITION POLICY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE (1996). 
32. MALcOLM B. COATE & AE. RoDRIGUEZ, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
MERGERS (1997). 
33. THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew 
N. Kleit eds., 1996). 
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Monopoly of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Pro-
fessor Kovacic is my successor as Chair of the Association of 
American Law Schools Section on Antitrust and Economic 
Regulation. He also has been very active in the American Bar 
Association's Antitrust Section and Public Contract law Sec-
tion, where he has served on a large number of task forces and 
in several different leadership positions. Among his many writ-
ings in the areas of competition law are his co-authorship, 
along with Ernest Gellhorn, of ANTITRUST LAw AND ECONOM-
ICS IN A NUTSHELL.34 Professor Kovacic has served as an offi-
cial advisor on antitrust and consumer protection issues to the 
governments of Egypt, EI Salvador, Georgia, Mongolia, Moroc-
co, Nepal, Russia, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, and has informally 
advised many other nations on trade regulation matters. 
The final author is Spencer Weber Waller, the Associate 
Dean for Academic Affairs at Brooklyn Law School and one of 
the co-directors of the Brooklyn Law School Center for the 
Study of International Business Law. He teaches antitrust and 
international trade law and explores the changing meaning of 
competition in both domestic and international markets in his 
many writings, including the recently published third edition 
of Antitrust and American Business Abroad. The essay he has 
contributed to this symposium is an expanded version of a 
presentation he made at a symposium held at New York Uni-
versity in memory of the late Dr. Betty Bock. 
34. ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAw AND ECONOM-
ICS IN A NUTSHELL (4th ed. 1994) 
